Be a Liar or You\u27re Fired! First Amendment Protection for Public Employees Who Object to Their Employer\u27s Criminal Demands by Barger, Keane A.
Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 66 | Issue 5 Article 4
10-2013
Be a Liar or You're Fired! First Amendment
Protection for Public Employees Who Object to
Their Employer's Criminal Demands
Keane A. Barger
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the First Amendment Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an
authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Keane A. Barger, Be a Liar or You're Fired! First Amendment Protection for Public Employees Who Object to Their Employer's
Criminal Demands, 66 Vanderbilt Law Review 1541 (2019)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol66/iss5/4
NOTES
Be a Liar or You're Fired! First
Amendment Protection for Public
Employees Who Object to Their
Employer's Criminal Demands
I. WHAT HAPPENED TO THE PERKS OF GOVERNMENT
WORK? PUBLIC EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH IN THE
ROBERTS COURT ERA ................................. 1542
II. FROM CONFUSION, TO CLARITY, AND BACK AGAIN:
GARCETTI'S INADEQUATE RESOLUTION OF PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH CLAIMS ......... ............. 1545
A. Before Garcetti: A Precarious Balancing Act........ 1545
B. Garcetti: A Rough Day in the Office ....... .... 1548
C. The Post-Garcetti Splits: Scope of
Employment, Subpoenaed Testimony, and
Sworn Affidavits ............................. 1552
1. Factors Defining the Scope
of Employment ..................... 1553
2. Testifying Under Oath ..... ........... 1555
3. Falsifying Affidavits................. 1557
III. APPLYING GARCETTI WHEN AN EMPLOYEE RAISES
AN ETHICAL OBJECTION ............................... 1560
A. The Citizen Analogue Test................ 1560
B. The No-Exceptions Bright-Line Rule.................... 1562
IV. A CRIMINAL LIABILITY SAFE HARBOR: ENFORCING
THE DEMOCRATICALLY ENACTED DEFINITION OF
GOOD GOVERNMENT .................................. 1563
A. Mechanics of the Criminal Liability
Safe Harbor ................................. 1563
B. Justifications for the Criminal Liability
Safe Harbor ............................. 1566
V. CONCLUSION ......................................... 1571
1541
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:5:1541
There is something profoundly disturbing, almost schizophrenic, about our
approach to human rights. We have fought wars, millions of us have served in
the military, and several hundred thousand Americans have died, defending
our country and protecting our freedom of speech and other rights. Yet we have
created a legal system that leaves those rights in the wastebasket when we go
to work.
-Lewis Maltbyl
I. WHAT HAPPENED TO THE PERKS OF GOVERNMENT WORK? PUBLIC
EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH IN THE ROBERTS COURT ERA
Public perception of the Roberts Court has been defined, to a
significant degree, by its First Amendment jurisprudence.2 Defending
free speech has been hailed as one of the Court's "signature projects."3
However, as some commentators have noted, once one looks beyond
the high-profile cases, the Roberts Court has been decidedly less pro-
speech. 4 Recent Supreme Court rulings have not looked kindly upon
free speech claims raised by students,5 humanitarian organizations, 6
and, most pertinent for this Note, public employees. 7 The apparent
disparity between the treatment of corporate and financial interests,
on the one hand, and the interests of labor, students, and
humanitarian organizations, on the other, prompted one scholar to
declare that "[tihe Roberts [C]ourt strongly protects speech that it
likes, while allowing regulation of speech it disfavors."8
1. LEWIS MALTBY, CAN THEY Do THAT? RETAKING OUR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE
WORKPLACE 3 (2009).
2. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011) (holding that
video game content is protected free speech); Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011)
(protesting at military funerals is protected free speech); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310,
368-71 (2010) (holding that independent corporate expenditures on elections are protected free
speech).
3. Adam Liptak, A Significant Term, with Bigger Cases Ahead, N.Y. TIMES (June 28,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/us/29scotus.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
4. David Cole, The Roberts Court's Free Speech Problem, N.Y. REV. BOOKS BLOG (June 28,
2010, 10:55 AM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2010/jun/28/roberts-courts-free-speech-
problem; Monica Youn, The Roberts Court's Free Speech Double Standard, AM. CONST. Soc. BLOG
(Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/the-roberts-courtE2%80%99s-free-speech-
double-standard.
5. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409-10 (2007) (holding that schools may restrict
student speech promoting drug use).
6. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724-26 (2010) (holding that
government may prohibit providing nonviolent material support to terrorist organizations,
including legal advice and services, without violating the Free Speech Clause).
7. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (rejecting public employee free speech
protection for speech occurring within the scope of an employee's duties).
8. Greg Stohr, Freedom of Speech is Buttressed as U.S. Supreme Court Concludes Term,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 27, 2011, 11:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-
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Garcetti v. Ceballos, in particular, has drawn intense criticism.9
In Garcetti, the Court held that the First Amendment does not protect
the speech of public employees made "pursuant to their official
duties."10 In so doing, the Court clarified, and departed from, prior
precedent governing public employee speech." The scholarly reaction
to Garcetti has been almost uniformly negative. 12 Some fear the
Court's holding will limit academic freedom in public universities and
deter whistleblowers from highlighting government failure; others
object to the unpredictability of Garcetti's inexact, case-by-case
standard that categorizes employee activities as falling inside or
outside the realm of "official duties."13
This Note addresses a significant, more recent problem: the
federal circuits have split over whether a public employee may be fired
for testifying truthfully in court or for refusing to falsify affidavits. 14
After the Court's inexorable command that all speech made pursuant
to official duties garners no First Amendment protection, some lower
28/speech-rights-triumph-as-u-s-high-court-limits-government-power.html (quoting Adam
Winkler).
9. 547 U.S. at 410; see, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti's Impact on the First Amendment
Speech Rights of Federal Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 117, 143-44 (2008) (advocating
complete reversal of Garcetti).
10. 547 U.S. at 421.
11. See infra Part II (noting the apparent abandonment of prior precedent in the Garcetti
decision).
12. See, e.g., Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and §
1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561, 562-63 (2008) (advocating
return to Pickering-Connick balancing test); Elizabeth M. Ellis, Note, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Public
Employees Left to Decide 'Tour Conscience or Your Job," 41 IND. L. REV. 187, 188 (advocating
narrow definition of job duties to limit impact of Garcetti); Christie S. Totten, Note, Quieting
Disruption: The Mistake of Curtailing Public Employees' Free Speech Under Garcetti v. Ceballos,
12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 233 (2008) (arguing that Garcetti creates more problems than it
solves).
13. See, e.g., Robert E. Drechsel, The Declining First Amendment Rights of Government
News Sources: How Garcetti v. Ceballos Threatens the Flow of Newsworthy Information, 16
COMM. L. & POL'Y 129, 139 (2011) (discussing the threat posed to whistleblowers by Garcetti);
Sheldon Nahmod, Academic Freedom and the Post-Garcetti Blues, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 54, 56
(2008) (noting the problems posed by Garcetti to academic freedom within the context of higher
education); Sarah F. Suma, Note, Uncertainty and Loss in the Free Speech Rights of Public
Employees Under Garcetti v. Ceballos, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 369, 379-80 (2008) (noting difficulty
of consistently defining job duties).
14. Compare Bowie v. Maddox, 653 F.3d 45, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding First Amendment
does not protect public employee's refusal to sign affidavit because he acted pursuant to official
duties), and Green v. Barrett, 226 F. App'x 883, 886 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding Free Speech
Clause does not protect jailer's official testimony regarding substandard prison conditions), with
Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 241 (2d Cir. 2011) (extending First Amendment protection to
employee's refusal to falsify an affidavit in order to conceal police brutality for his superiors), and
Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding speech of police officer in civil suit
deposition is protected by the First Amendment).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
courts have simply applied a straightforward "official duties" test.15 By
contrast, other lower courts distinguish giving subpoenaed testimony
and filing affidavits from a public employee's official duties because
these activities have a citizen analogue. 6 However, courts have not
delineated the exact parameters of this "citizen-like activities"
exception, nor have they identified a rationale solidly rooted in First
Amendment jurisprudence that squares such an exception with
Garcetti.
This Note intends to provide a coherent and practical solution
to the problem of public employers threatening to fire employees for
refusing to engage in speech that they find ethically objectionable.
This Note does not intend to rehash the soundness of Garcetti's central
holding. The dissenting opinions in Garcetti and subsequent legal
scholarship have rendered the perceived deficiencies of that decision
clear.17 For better or worse, the doctrine of stare decisis and the
current membership of the Court make wholesale reversal of Garcetti
unlikely. As such, this Note accepts Garcetti's holding as it stands,
while seeking to define its contours and round its rough edges of
inequity. The difficulty is to discern how one can both embrace
Garcetti and conclude that sound First Amendment principles bar the
manifest injustice inflicted on a public employee who is fired for
refusing to lie in order to cover up government abuse.
In Part II, this Note provides an overview of the Court's pre-
Garcetti decisions that establish the normative principles underlying
its free speech jurisprudence regarding public employees. Part II also
examines the holding and rationale of Garcetti and identifies three
interrelated post-Garcetti circuit splits: (1) the breadth of an
employee's scope of employment; (2) whether an employee's
subpoenaed testimony is protected; and (3) whether an employee's
sworn affidavit is protected. For each circuit split, courts have applied
one of two broad approaches: the citizen analogue test or the bright-
line official duties test.18 Part III analyzes the strengths and
15. Bowie, 653 F.3d at 47-48; see infra Part III.B (discussing the no-exceptions bright-line
rule).
16. Jackler, 658 F.3d at 241; see infra Part III.A (discussing the citizen analogue test).
17. For a comprehensive overview of the perverse consequences and problems associated
with Garcetti, particularly the failure of the decision to fulfill its own goal of clearly delineating
unprotected versus protected employee speech, see generally, Thomas Keenan, Note, Circuit
Court Interpretations of Garcetti v. Ceballos and the Development of Public Employee Speech, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841, 842-43 (2011) (providing overview of facts courts have emphasized to
define official duties and proposing return to balancing test).
18. The courts themselves have not suggested that the three circuit splits can be broadly
categorized into two different approaches that employ two different tests. This Note separates
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weaknesses of each approach. Part IV proposes the creation of a
"criminal liability safe harbor" for the official duties rule of Garcetti.
Under this proposal, if the employee can prove, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that compliance with the employer's directive would
make the employee criminally liable, then the employee should be able
to speak freely without fear of termination. Such a safe harbor would
balance the public's right to an efficient, accountable bureaucracy with
employees' freedom of conscience.
II. FROM CONFUSION, TO CLARITY, AND BACK AGAIN: GARCETTT'S
INADEQUATE RESOLUTION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH CLAIMS
The Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence
governing public employees is guided by three baseline principles,
against which the wisdom of any rule must be justified: (1) public
knowledge about government affairs, (2) respect for the autonomy of
public employees, and (3) efficient administration of the law. This Part
identifies traditional First Amendment principles long protected
within the public employee context, discusses Garcetti and its
newfound emphasis on the principle of government efficiency, and
provides an overview of the current circuit splits regarding the
application of Garcetti. This doctrinal path-from the confusion of the
pre-Garcetti balancing test to the purported clarity of Garcetti's scope-
of-employment rule, back to confusion-illustrates that the Court's
contemporary jurisprudence is flawed.
A. Before Garcetti: A Precarious Balancing Act
Before Garcetti, the Court analyzed the free speech rights of
public employees under a case-by-case balancing approach, known as
the Pickering-Connick test.19 In Pickering v. Board of Education, the
plaintiff, a public school teacher, wrote a letter to the editor of the
local newspaper. 20 The teacher excoriated the school board for
lavishing money on the school's athletic department and criticized the
superintendent for preventing teachers from opposing a recent bond
issue.21 In response, the school board fired the teacher for
federal case law into these categories as a useful, descriptive method for analyzing the conflicting
post-Garcetti decisions.
19. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (applying balancing test); Pickering v.
Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (adopting balancing test).




insubordination. 2 2 The Court held that dismissal of the teacher for his
comments in the newspaper violated the First Amendment because
the teacher's letter addressed matters of public concern. 23 The Court
adopted a balancing test weighing "the interests of the teacher, as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern" against the
"interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of
the public services it performs through its employees." 24
The Pickering decision highlights the competing values at play
when courts assess the free speech rights of public employees. First,
the Court acknowledged that public servants possess intimate and
sometimes exclusive knowledge about government activities that
voters deserve to know. "Accordingly, it is essential that they be able
to speak out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory
dismissal."25 In other words, the Court enunciated a public policy
rationale for protecting employee speech: a free marketplace of ideas
is a necessary prerequisite to optimal policy outcomes. Second, the
Court noted that public employees retain an independent interest in
their autonomy.26 The Court emphasized this sentiment by
referencing Keyishian v. Board of Regents-a prior decision that
prohibited public employers from forcing their employees to sign a
pledge disavowing Communist party principles. 27 Third, the Court
affirmed the importance of effectively administering public services.
Had the comments of the teacher in Pickering been directed toward a
co-worker with whom he must maintain a close working relationship,
the Court implied that the case could have come out differently. 28
However, the Court also suggested that something more than
efficiency was at stake. The Court emphasized that the teacher's
speech did not disrupt the "proper performance of his daily duties,"29
nor did his speech impede the school's "proper functioning."30 The
Court did not address whether an employee may speak freely about
public issues involving internal office affairs.
22. Id. at 564.
23. Id. at 574-75.
24. Id. at 568.
25. Id. at 572.
26. See id. at 568 (denying that public employment may be conditioned on the surrender of
constitutional rights).
27. 385 U.S. 589, 605-08 (1967).
28. 391 U.S. at 570.
29. Id. at 572 (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 570 (emphasis added).
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The Court came closer to answering this question in Connick v.
Meyers.31 In Connick, a district attorney-in order to protest a transfer
order--circulated a questionnaire to other employees regarding
various topics, including transfer policies, morale, confidence in
supervisors, the need for a grievance committee, and whether co-
workers were being pressured to work in political campaigns. 32 In
response to the district attorney's intra-office political activity, her
supervisor terminated her employment.33 Writing for a five-member
majority, Justice White concluded that the plaintiff was permissibly
terminated because her speech was not protected by the First
Amendment.34 The Court applied the Pickering balancing test and
attempted to clarify what constitutes a "public concern."35 The
threshold question in every case, the Court held, is whether the
speech at issue can "be fairly considered as relating to any matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community."36 If not, the
employee fails to speak as a "citizen" on a matter of "public concern,"
and the employer then retains full managerial control to impose an
adverse employment action. 37 The Court provided little guidance,
however, for other judges to determine what constitutes a matter of
public concern; Justice White simply stated that the distinction "must
be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement,
as revealed by the whole record."38
Applying this case-by-case standard, the Court found that the
plaintiffs questions concerning trust in supervisors, morale, and the
need for a grievance committee were not questions of "public import in
evaluating the performance" of an elected district attorney and were
thus not a matter of public concern.39 However, the Court did hold
that the questionnaire item regarding whether coworkers were ever
pressured to work in political campaigns was a matter of public
concern because there is a "demonstrated interest in this country" in
employing civil servants based on merit, not political affiliation. 40
Nonetheless, the Court found that this public concern must still be
weighed against the speech's effect on the "efficiency" and "integrity"
31. 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983).
32. Id. at 141.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 154.
35. Id. at 142-43.
36. Id. at 146.
37. Id. at 147.
38. Id. at 147-48.
39. Id. at 148.
40. Id. at 149.
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of the district attorneys' discharge of their public duties. 41 Accordingly,
the Court held that the plaintiffs speech was not protected because
the questionnaires amounted to an insurrection that undermined the
personal relationships essential to effective operation of the office. 42
Thus, before Garcetti, courts used a two-step process to
determine whether public employees' speech was protected. A court
first defined the amorphous line between matters of public and private
concern, and then balanced public speech values and speaker-centered
speech values against the effective and proper administration of the
law. Public speech values included robust democratic debate and
government accountability, while speaker-centered speech values
included personal autonomy and moral self-fulfillment. The Pickering-
Connick doctrine left the law opaque and unpredictable, on the one
hand, but flexible enough to promote intuitively just outcomes, on the
other.
B. Garcetti: A Rough Day in the Office
In Garcetti, the Court modified the Pickering-Connick test by
significantly narrowing the scope of First Amendment protection in
the workplace. The public employee in Garcetti was Richard Ceballos,
a calendar deputy district attorney for the Los Angeles County
District Attorney's Office ("LADA"). 43 A defense attorney contacted
Ceballos about a pending criminal matter, pointing out several
inaccuracies in the affidavit that the police used to obtain a search
warrant.44 The defense attorney asked Ceballos to investigate the
truthfulness of the affidavit. In response, Ceballos visited the area
described by the affidavit and found what he believed were several
serious misrepresentations of fact.45 After personally viewing the
scene and speaking to the warrant affiant, Ceballos concluded that the
evidence about tire marks and roadways that the police had used to
justify the search had been doctored by the investigators. 4 6 Disturbed
by his findings, Ceballos prepared a memo for his superiors that
explained his concerns about the falsity of the affidavit and
recommended that the criminal case be dismissed.47 In light of these
41. Id. at 150-51 (quoting Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 373 (1882)).
42. Id. at 151-54.
43. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 414.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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accusations, the sheriffs department contacted Ceballos's superiors
and reprimanded him for meddling in the case. 48
In spite of Ceballos's memo, the LADA decided to proceed with
the criminal prosecution. At the suppression hearing, the defendant
called Ceballos to the stand to impeach the affidavit based on his
investigation. 49 The court ultimately rejected the defendant's
challenge to the warrant.50 Subsequently, the LADA reassigned
Ceballos to another courthouse, denied him a promotion, and then
demoted him.51 In response, Ceballos filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit
claiming that his public employer retaliated against him for speaking
about matters that were protected free speech under the First
Amendment. 52
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit applied the two-part Pickering-
Connick test, in accordance with the approach taken by the majority of
other lower courts.53 Because Ceballos was attempting to expose
wrongdoing and to remedy perceived government misconduct, the
Ninth Circuit found that he spoke "as a citizen upon matters of public
concern." 54 Then, balancing this public concern against society's
interest in effective administration, the court ruled that the facts
weighed in Ceballos's favor because the government introduced no
evidence showing that his memo disrupted the legitimate work of the
office.55
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Ninth Circuit and held that Ceballos's memo did not constitute
protected speech because "his expressions were made pursuant to his
duties."56 Writing for a five-Justice majority, Justice Kennedy began
his analysis by justifying the Court's decision as a mere continuation
of the doctrine enunciated in Pickering and Connick.5 7 He reiterated
that courts must still determine whether the employee is speaking as
a citizen upon a matter of public concern because a state may not
arbitrarily deprive a citizen of fundamental constitutional rights.5 8
48. Id.
49. Id. at 414-15.
50. Id. at 415.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 415-16.
54. Id. at 416 (quoting Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004)).
55. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 416.
56. Id. at 421.
57. See id. at 417-19 (noting that the two-step inquiry utilized in Pickering and Connick
remains the principal guide when interpreting the constitutional protections accorded to public
employee speech).
58. Id. at 419.
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Additionally, the public has an interest "in receiving the well-informed
views of government employees engaging in civic discussion."59 At the
same time, Justice Kennedy affirmed that the Court must still give
effect to concerns about the efficient administration of the workplace
and the government's prerogatives as an employer.60
Justice Kennedy's articulation of the principles at stake in the
case might suggest, at first glance, that the Court was maintaining
the status quo in this area of First Amendment doctrine. However, the
Court's application of the Pickering-Connick test to the facts of the
case seemed to place a thumb on the scale in favor of employer control.
The Court explained that the fundamental flaw in the Ninth Circuit's
analysis resided in its misconception of the phrase "as a citizen on a
matter of public concern": namely, its holding that the speech must
press upon a matter of grave public importance related to state
action.61 The Court clarified that this phrase does not refer to the
subject matter of the speech, but rather the status of the speaker.
The question then is whether public employees make
statements "pursuant to their official duties," thus rendering their
speech a creature of the state rather than the product of a citizen. 62 If
an employee such as Ceballos writes a memo pursuant to his duties as
a calendar deputy attorney, then he cannot be speaking as a citizen. 63
By contrast, the teacher in Pickering wrote a letter about the school as
a concerned citizen, not as an employee performing duties for the
school itself.64 Whereas calendar deputy attorneys are hired to
investigate the accuracy of affidavits, teachers are not hired to
evaluate the wisdom of a school district's decisions about bonding and
capital investment. Therefore, the Court reasoned that determining
the free speech rights of public employees requires drawing a bright
line between an individual's status as an employee and as a citizen.65
'When a public employee speaks pursuant to employment
responsibilities . . . there is no relevant analogue to speech by citizens
who are not government employees." Moreover, the Court insisted
that this demarcation is warranted because conducting the Pickering-
Connick balancing test "sometimes has proved difficult." Therefore,
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 418, 421-24 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit's holding would require courts to
measure the public importance of employee speech, causing "permanent judicial intervention"
inconsistent with federalism and separation of powers).
62. Id. at 421.
63. Id. at 424.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 421-24.
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the Court intimated that limiting the judicial inquiry to the
identification of employee duties would provide a more administrable
judicial standard.
Applying the official duties test, the Court held that the memo
written by Ceballos was merely a product of what he was "employed to
do."66 The memo was part and parcel of his duty as an attorney to
investigate the veracity of affidavits and report this information to his
superiors. His employer was then entitled to judge him based on this
performance.67 The Court stated that government employers need to
retain the ability to discipline and control employees for speech made
pursuant to their duties, and the judiciary-as a separate, coequal
branch-should refrain from interference in the managerial discretion
of executive branch officials.68 In addition, employers have
"heightened interests" in controlling government employees' speech:
"Official communications have official consequences, creating a need
for substantive consistency and clarity. Supervisors must ensure that
their employees' official communications are accurate, demonstrate
sound judgment, and promote the employer's mission."69
Ironically, despite its obvious concern with creating clear rules
for judges and employers, the Court refrained from articulating a
"comprehensive framework' for determining whether employee speech
is made pursuant to employment duties. Instead, the Court
summarily noted that the "proper inquiry is a practical one," and
formal job descriptions should not be dispositive because they "often
bear little resemblance to the duties an employee actually is expected
to perform."70
Despite the apparent rigidity of the Court's public duties rule,
Garcetti left some room for maneuvering by future judges and lawyers.
The final paragraph of Justice Kennedy's opinion consists of a short,
Delphic paragraph that creates more questions than it answers. First,
the Court stated that Congress, as well as local and state legislatures,
can and should enact statutory whistle-blower schemes that afford
public employees a safe forum to expose wrongdoing.71 Thus, the Court
contemplated that legislative action would serve as a limiting force
that softens the impact of its opinion. Additionally, the Court stated
that several safeguards, such as professional rules of conduct and the
66. Id. at 421.
67. Id. at 422.
68. Id. at 422-23.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 424-25.
71. Id. at 425.
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courts' longstanding respect for academic freedom, would limit the
decision's impact. 72 Most importantly, the Court concluded by
opaquely suggesting that "obligations arising from any other
applicable constitutional provisions and the mandates of criminal and
civil laws[] protect employees and provide checks on supervisors who
would order unlawful or otherwise inappropriate actions."73 Despite
these cryptic, parting words about the extent of the public duties test,
the Court appeared to establish clarity that no balancing test could
provide: if speech is part of the job, it is not protected. Any lingering
impression of clarity, however, did not last for long.
C. The Post-Garcetti Splits: Scope of Employment, Subpoenaed
Testimony, and Sworn Affidavits
While the Court may have intended to stabilize public
employee free speech doctrine by superimposing a bright-line
refinement on the Pickering-Connick test, decisions by lower courts
since 2006 have fatally undermined that goal. This Section provides
an overview of the major areas of contention raised by the official
duties rule and illustrates the doctrinal morass caused by Garcetti.
Broadly speaking, courts have split on three issues in resolving
cases post-Garcetti: (1) the scope of a government employee's official
duties,74 (2) the testimony of public officials pursuant to the subpoena
power,76 and (3) the refusal of public employees to alter affidavits and
other documents requiring sworn testimony.76 The literature on
Garcetti tends to treat each of these splits as a distinct issue requiring
independent resolution.77 Thus, scholars have sought to create refined
tests for determining the scope of employment,78  with specific
72. Id.
73. Id. at 425-26.
74. See infra notes 80-94 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 95-113 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 114-28 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Parker Graham, Note, Whistleblowers in the Workplace: The Government
Employee's "Official Duty" to Tell the Truth, 65 SMU L. REV. 685, 694-700 (2012) (focusing on
employees' refusal to falsify affidavits); Adelaida Jasperse, Note, Constitutional Law-Damned if
You Do, Damned if You Don't: A Public Employee's Trilemma Regarding Truthful Testimony, 33
w. NEW ENG. L. REV. 623, 651-56 (2011) (focusing only on compelled testimony); Keenan, supra
note 17, at 842-43, 876-77 (analyzing only the scope-of-employment determination and
proposing that courts examine "duties either plainly required by employers or so intertwined as
to be nearly inseparable").
78. See Sarah L. Fabian, Note, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Whether an Employee Speaks as a
Citizen or as a Public Employee-Who Decides?, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1675, 1699 (2009)
(proposing that scope-of-employment analysis should be left to juries as a question of fact, not
law); Tyler Wiese, Note, Seeing Through the Smoke: "Official Duties" in the Wake of Garcetti v.
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doctrinal exceptions for subpoenaed testimony or sworn affidavits.79
However, this Section explains how the three circuit splits are
attributable to the same source: the judiciary's uneasiness with
condoning public employee punishment stemming from ethical
objections to government misconduct. In other words, the three splits
reflect the common underlying policy concern that the Garcetti public
duties test inordinately emphasizes efficient governance at the
expense of traditional free speech values. This point will be important
later; since the three circuit splits stem from a single cause, they are
amenable to a single solution.
1. Factors Defining the Scope of Employment
The first area of confusion among the federal appellate courts,
which has engendered a plethora of circuit-specific rules, is how to
define a government employee's scope of employment.80 All circuits
have adhered to the Supreme Court's directive that the scope-of-
employment inquiry must be practical and all factors must be
weighed. However, some circuits have found certain factors to be more
dispositive than others, presumably in an attempt to give the scope-of-
employment inquiry the bright-line status envisioned by the Court.
The lower federal courts have not adopted definitive tests, but several
broad approaches have emerged.
For instance, the Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits
emphasize the audience to which the speech is directed.81 The Seventh
Circuit has focused on whether the employee directed his or her
speech to an employer within his or her "chain of command."8 2 In
Bivens v. Trent, a police officer told his superiors that a shooting range
frequented by police officers was unsafe due to lead contamination. 83
Applying the chain-of-command test, the court found that the officer's
speech was not protected because it was directed toward his
Ceballos, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 509, 523 (2010) (arguing that courts should define scope of
employment using an "assigned-responsibilities" analysis).
79. See, e.g., Leslie Pope, Comment, Huppert v. City of Pittsburg: The Contested Status of
Police Officers' Subpoenaed Testimony After Garcetti v. Ceballos, 119 YALE L.J. 2143, 2144 (2010)
(asserting that courts should draw bright-line rule classifying subpoenaed testimony as protected
speech).
80. For a particularly comprehensive discussion of the various tests and factors emphasized
in different cases, see Keenan, supra note 17, at 847-60, 870-76 (providing overview of criteria
courts have used to define official duties and then proposing return to a modified balancing test).
81. Id. at 848.
82. See Bivens v. Trent, 591 F.3d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding no protection for speech
because employee spoke to superior in the chain of command).
83. Id. at 557.
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superiors. 84 The Bivens decision stands in direct contrast to Barclay v.
Michalsky.85 In Barclay, a nurse complained to her superiors about
other employees' misconduct, including sleeping on the job.86 The
District of Connecticut disregarded the chain-of-command test and
held that the speech was protected because it fell beyond the
employee's duties.87 Though the speech was directed to superiors, the
court focused on the fact that the nurse had received no training on
filing reports and had been reprimanded by her supervisors for prior
reports.88 Thus, the weight accorded to the chain-of-command factor
varies from court to court.
Furthermore, despite the Supreme Court's warning against
relying solely on formal job descriptions to define duties, these
descriptions have nonetheless played a critical role in the outcome of
several cases in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. 89 For instance, in
Rohrbough v. University of Colorado Hospital Authority, the Tenth
Circuit treated a hospital policy requiring medical staff to report
inadequate care to supervisors as a defining feature of the transplant
coordinator's duties.90 The hospital's official policy was dispositive in
spite of the plaintiffs evidence that she was not actually expected to
provide such reports in practice.91 By contrast, in Williams v. Reilly, a
jail's policy manual required employees to report prisoner abuse to
supervisors. 92 Because the employer adopted a tacit policy of
discouraging these reports, the Fifth Circuit held that a genuine issue
of material fact existed as to whether the report fell within the
plaintiffs duties.93 In short, courts are weighing very similar facts in
sharply divergent ways.
Finally, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits have asked whether the
speech at issue would not have existed but for a "public employee's
professional responsibilities."94 This but-for causation inquiry tends to
84. Id. at 560.
85. 451 F. Supp. 2d 386 (D. Conn. 2006).
86. Id. at 390.
87. Id. at 395-96.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Rohrbough v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 596 F.3d 741, 748 (10th Cir. 2010)
(relying on policy requiring medical staff employees to report deficient care); Marable v.
Nitchman, 511 F.3d 924, 933 (9th Cir. 2007) (relying on job manual as interpretive guide
describing boundaries of employment).
90. 596 F.3d at 748-49.
91. Id.
92. 275 F. App'x 385, 387 (5th Cir. 2008).
93. Id. at 389.
94. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 438 (2006); see, e.g., Fox v. Traverse City Area Pub.
Schs. Bd. of Educ., 605 F.3d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that teacher's complaint about
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weaken free speech protection. To some extent, every case necessarily
requires an inquiry into whether the speech is related to the
employee's job. The but-for causation standard therefore errs in favor
of the administrative efficiency rationale, rather than employee
autonomy and disclosure of government misconduct.
Given the varying factors emphasized by lower courts, the
scope-of-employment doctrine has not proven easy to apply. Some of
the variability in the scope-of-employment inquiry is probably an
inevitable consequence of applying a case-by-case standard. In the
absence of concrete rules, some divergence is to be expected. More
troubling, though, is the fact that there are few guidelines for courts to
use when approaching the unique facts of each case. Thus, judges
seeking to protect public speech in spite of Garcetti can simply
construe the scope of an employee's duties broadly. Moving the scope-
of-employment goalpost provides creative judges with an escape hatch
to find First Amendment protection. While all legal tests are prone to
judicial policymaking and such discretion may sometimes even be
desirable, the rule of law requires at least a moderate degree of non-
arbitrariness. The values of predictability and transparency demand
more consistency than Garcetti can provide.
2. Testifying Under Oath
Courts have also split over whether testimony given by public
employees pursuant to the subpoena power constitutes protected
speech. 95 Some courts have adopted a hard-line pursuant-to-duties
test, holding that an employee's subpoenaed testimony regarding
work-related matters does not constitute protected First Amendment
speech. For instance, in Huppert v. Pittsburg, the plaintiff was
employed as a patrol officer and was asked to investigate corruption at
a local public works yard.96 Huppert claimed that subsequent to this
assignment, his superiors at the police department treated him with
derision. His employer denied his promotion, despite the fact that he
scored highly on the requisite exams, and transferred him to a
dilapidated building within the police department known as the
class size was unprotected because it would not have occurred but for her job as a teacher);
Bradley v. James, 479 F.3d 536, 538 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that police officer's statement that
another officer was intoxicated, and which was made in response to an official investigation into
misconduct, was unprotected because it would not have occurred but for his job as a policeman).
95. For an in-depth overview of this circuit split and its pre-Garcetti origins, see Jasperse,
supra note 77, at 651-56 (arguing that truthful testimony at hearings should be protected by
analogizing First Amendment protection to immunity for civil damages due to compelled
testimony).
96. 574 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2009).
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"Penal Colony," where disfavored officers were routinely assigned.97
Later, a grand jury subpoenaed Huppert to testify about the allegedly
corrupt practices of the police department.98 Due to his testimony, the
department subjected Huppert to retaliatory measures meant to
discourage others within the force from testifying about corruption. 99
Adopting a narrow, absolutist reading of Garcetti's definition of
employee duties, the Ninth Circuit held that the subpoenaed
testimony was not protected under the First Amendment. 00 Under
California law, it is the "duty" of police officers to disclose
incriminating facts "and to testify freely concerning such facts when
called upon to do so before any duly constituted court or grand jury."'0
As such, the court rejected the contention that Huppert spoke as a
citizen. 102
The Eleventh Circuit adopted virtually the same reasoning in
Green v. Barret, a case with startling facts that raise concerns about
strict application of the pursuant-to-duties test.103 In Green, the chief
jailer testified in a hearing to determine whether a convicted
murderer should be transferred from a local jail to a maximum
security prison. Video showed the inmate regularly opening his cell
door and wandering through the halls. 04 The jailer testified that
because the locks often broke or could be jammed, leaving the inmate
in the jail was unsafe. 05 The next day, the sheriff fired the jailer
without providing a written explanation and, in a remarkable display
of candor, the sheriff told the local newspaper, "I was so concerned
about that testimony that the chief gave that she was terminated
today."06 Finding that the chief jailer was responsible for the
conditions in the jail, the Court found his testimony unprotected
because determining if an inmate should be transferred is necessarily
part of his job. 07
By contrast, in Reilly v. Atlantic City, the Third Circuit held
that subpoenaed trial testimony by a police officer constitutes
97. Id.
98. Id. at 700.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 708.
101. Id. at 707 (quoting Christal v. Police Comm'n, 92 P.2d 416, 419 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1939)).
102. Id. at 708.
103. 226 F. App'x 883, 886 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that Free Speech Clause does not protect
jailer's official testimony regarding substandard prison conditions).
104. Id. at 884.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 886.
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protected speech under the Garcetti test.08 In doing so, the court
expressed great misgivings about the moral and policy issues at stake,
suggesting that a strict reading of Garcetti creates outcomes simply
too unjust for judges to condone.109 A prosecutor summoned Reilly to
testify against another police officer as part of a highly publicized
investigation into the famously corrupt Atlantic City Police
Department. In response, the Department retaliated against him.110
Applying Garcetti, the Court reasoned that Reilly's testimony was
protected speech because "every citizen . . . owes to his society the duty
of giving testimony to aid in the enforcement of the law.""' Thus, the
court stated that a "claim relating to truthful testimony in court must
surely be analyzed independently to protect the integrity of the
judicial process."112 Because truthful testimony involves performing a
basic civic duty, the court held that Reilly did not speak simply as an
employee.113
With regard to testifying under oath, the courts cannot agree
on how strictly to apply the purportedly bright-line rule announced in
Garcetti. Some courts appear to adopt the position that Garcetti
completely limits their ability to fashion exceptions based on equitable
principles. Other courts, as in Reilly, seem to believe that the Supreme
Court could not possibly have intended for the scope-of-employment
rule to undermine fundamental precepts of judicial integrity. These
courts recognize, correctly, that Garcetti should be subject to narrow
exceptions.
3. Falsifying Affidavits
Finally, the Second Circuit and D.C. Circuit have split
regarding whether an employee may refuse to certify affidavits or
other sworn statements that the employee reasonably believes to be
false. In Jackler v. Byrne, a police officer alleged retaliatory discharge
for his refusal to include false statements in a sworn affidavit about a
108. 532 F.3d 216, 231-32 (3d Cir. 2008).
109. Id. at 231.
110. Id. at 220, 222.
111. Id. at 228 (quoting Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n.2 (1961) (upholding
conviction of defendant for contempt of court due to refusal to give grand jury testimony)).
112. Reilly, 532 F.3d at 231 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 444 (2006) (Souter,
J., dissenting)).
113. Id. at 231; see also Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that
police officer's deposition testimony in a civil suit filed by a coworker against the police
department did not constitute speech made pursuant to his duties, because the officer was not
hired in order to provide testimony on behalf of fellow coworkers, even if he testified about events
"made pursuant to his official duties").
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civilian's complaint of excessive force. 114 The facts here are
particularly troubling and illustrate why courts are so reluctant to
read Garcetti literally. When called to assist with an arrest, Jackler
witnessed a fellow police officer place a handcuffed suspect in a patrol
car and then punch him across the face.115 After the arrestee filed a
complaint alleging excessive force, Jackler was directed to file a report
detailing the incident." 6 After reviewing the report, Jackler's
superiors requested that he omit any reference to excessive force.1' 7
He refused to change the report, and his supervisor subsequently
terminated him.118
Though Jackler admitted that he wrote the report pursuant to
his duties as a police officer, the Second Circuit held that his speech
was nonetheless protected by the First Amendment because refusing
to falsely testify about a matter of public concern has a citizen
analogue.119 A private citizen, the court argued, has a legal right to
refuse to rescind a true accusation, to make a false one, or to file a
false police report.120 Because making truthful official statements is a
right afforded to citizens independent of their status as public
employees, such speech should be protected.121 Thus, the court circled
back to the Pickering-Connick test's respect for public employee
autonomy and informed democratic accountability. Some speech is so
integrated into the concept of citizenship that public employment
cannot suspend First Amendment protection. To find support for this
citizen analogue test, the court relied on a single line in Garcetti:
"When a public employee speaks pursuant to employment
responsibilities, however, there is no relevant analogue to speech by
citizens who are not government employees."122 The Second Circuit
mollified the rigidity of the Garcetti rule by attributing the citizen
analogue test to this language.
In Bowie v. Maddox, the D.C. Circuit took precisely the
opposite tack and disparaged the Second Circuit for stretching
Garcetti beyond any reasonable interpretation.123 In a strikingly
114. 658 F.3d 225, 231-32, 242 (2d Cir. 2011).
115. Id. at 230.
116. Id. at 230-31.
117. Id. at 231.
118. Id. at 231-32.
119. Id. at 241-42.
120. Id. at 241.
121. Id. at 239.
122. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006).
123. 653 F.3d 45, 47-48 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding First Amendment did not protect public
employee's refusal to sign affidavit because he acted pursuant to official duties).
1558 [Vol. 66:5:1541
BE A LIAR OR YOU'RE FIRED
similar fact pattern, Assistant Inspector General Bowie was fired for
refusing to sign an affidavit drafted by his employer that he believed
contained false statements regarding an employment discrimination
claim.124 Rejecting the citizen analogue rationale of Jackler, the court
held that Bowie's speech was not protected because testifying about
discrimination claims fell within the parameters of his official duties.
The court claimed that Jackler read Garcetti "backwards" because the
thrust of Justice Kennedy's decision was that certain speech that
would normally be protected for citizens under the First Amendment
loses that protection when made pursuant to official duties.125 Simply
put, the Supreme Court intended that "the rules are different for
government employees speaking in their official capacities." 126
Interestingly, the court in Bowie took the rare step of suggesting that
the Second Circuit adopted its "dubious interpretation of Garcetti"
purely for policy reasons.127 While the D.C. Circuit sympathized with
the employee's defiance of the employer's clearly illegal actions, "the
illegality of a government employer's order does not necessarily mean
the employee has a cause of action under the First Amendment when
he contravenes that order."128
In this way, the D.C. Circuit explicitly stated the policy tension
underlying many lower court interpretations of Garcetti. With regard
to subpoenaed testimony and refusals to falsify official reports, courts
have found the strict application of Garcetti unpalatable and are
searching for ways to allay its sometimes outrageously unjust
outcomes. Consequently, this area of First Amendment doctrine has
remained stubbornly confused. The wide disparity in resolution of
post-Garcetti cases suggests that many courts are repulsed by public
employers who punish employees in order to salvage their reputations.
Judges are arguably attempting to find cracks in the Garcetti edifice
by emphasizing the importance of certain citizen-like conduct.
Perhaps more surreptitiously, courts can practice a case-by-case
doctrinal runaround by massaging which factors to emphasize in the
scope-of-employment inquiry. A solution providing equity for public
employees, while preserving fidelity to Garcetti and the Court's desire
for administrable standards, is desperately needed. A successful
resolution of the post-Garcetti circuit splits must meld protection for
public employees from unseemly behavior with a definition of
124. Id. at 46.






unseemliness grounded in more than the whims and policy
preferences of courts.
III. APPLYING GARCETTT WHEN AN EMPLOYEE RAISES AN ETHICAL
OBJECTION
From the three circuit splits described above, one can identify
two broad methods of judicial resolution: the citizen analogue test and
the bright-line rule against job-duty exceptions (hereinafter, the "no-
exceptions bright-line rule"). Ultimately, neither the citizen analogue
test nor the no-exceptions bright-line rule provides a satisfactory
resolution. Each approach swings the pendulum of protection too far
in one direction or the other, without properly weighing the values of
clarity and ease of administration against a respect for individual
autonomy. This Part first analyzes the citizen analogue test,
identifying both its strengths and weaknesses, and then explores the
no-exceptions bright-line rule.
A. The Citizen Analogue Test
Although not all courts have used the "citizen analogue"
terminology adopted in Jackler v. Byrne, the logic of that case has
been applied by lower courts to find exceptions to Garcetti's scope-of-
employment doctrine. 129 In particular, courts have used the citizen
analogue rationale to find First Amendment protection for employees
who object to testifying untruthfully or disseminating false
information. Ultimately, the citizen analogue test is an unsatisfactory
solution to the circuit splits, as it is not firmly grounded in Supreme
Court precedent and lacks a solid theoretical underpinning.
First, the test only finds textual support in one line of dicta
from Justice Kennedy's opinion in Garcetti: 'When a public employee
speaks pursuant to employment responsibilities . . . there is no
relevant analogue to speech by citizens who are not government
employees."130 In the context of the opinion, Justice Kennedy was
emphasizing that some activities, like writing letters to the local
newspaper in Pickering, fall outside the scope of one's employment
duties.131 The Court's statement does not suggest that some employee
activities are exempt, despite being performed pursuant to public
duties.
129. 658 F.3d 225, 230-31 (2d Cir. 2011); Reilly v. Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 231-32 (3d
Cir. 2008); Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2007).
130. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006).
131. Id. at 423.
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By the same token, the citizen analogue test suffers doctrinally
from the fact that it envisions a complete dichotomy between the
duties of citizens and employees that simply does not exist. 132 For
instance, in Reilly the court deployed Supreme Court precedent
concerning the important, universal duty of all citizens to testify freely
before duly constituted tribunals; the court concluded that this duty is
independent from, and somehow breaks the continuity of, a public
official testifying before a court in her official capacity. 133 Similarly,
the Jackler court's reasoning suggested that the plaintiffs job duties
were transformed into citizen duties.134 However, in each case the
courts overlooked the fact that under Garcetti, when a public employee
refuses to falsify an affidavit, she is necessarily acting as both a public
employee within her official duties and as a citizen. To pretend that
an official duty is somehow exempt because that duty possesses a
citizen analogue ignores this overlap.
Perhaps the most damning critique of the citizen analogue test
is its unprincipled ambiguity; the general contours of citizen activities
are too amorphous to constitute much of a test at all. As the D.C.
Circuit vividly stated in Bowie v. Maddox, "A test that allows a First
Amendment retaliation claim to proceed whenever the government
employee can identify a civilian analogue for his speech is about as
useful as a mosquito net made of chicken wire: All official speech,
viewed at a sufficient level of abstraction, has a civilian analogue."1 35
For example, the district attorney who wrote the memo in Garcetti is
no different from a criminal defendant who testifies in order to refute
the facts contained in an indictment; but only the criminal defendant's
right to refute the indictment would certainly be subject to free speech
protection. 36 For this reason, the citizen analogue test is not cabined
by any identifiable doctrinal limitations and may consist of nothing
more than a judge deciding that the employer's behavior was
unjust.137 For those who advocate for complete abrogation of Garcetti,
the benefit of the citizen analogue test lies in the discretion given to
judges to reach the "correct" policy outcome.138 As a matter of creating
132. See id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ('The notion that there is a categorical difference
between speaking as a citizen and speaking in the course of one's employment is quite wrong.").
133. 532 F.3d at 223-31.
134. Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 241-42 (2d Cir. 2011).
135. 653 F.3d 45, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
136. Id.
137. See Graham, supra note 77, at 703-04 (arguing that the citizen analogue test "risks a
wholesale renunciation of Garcetti" because, construed broadly enough, virtually any public
employee activity can be likened to similar activity in the private sector).
138. See David L. Hudson, Jr., 2nd Circuit Ruling Offers Glimmer of Hope in Post-Garcetti
World, FIRST AMEND. CTR. (July 28, 2011), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/2nd-circuit-
2013] 1561
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
a sound and predictable legal standard, however, the citizen analogue
test leaves much to be desired.
B. The No-Exceptions Bright-Line Rule
By contrast, the second approach is a no-exceptions bright-line
rule against protecting speech made pursuant to a public employee's
duties. Despite the unjust outcomes that strict application of Garcetti
might produce, several lower courts have taken these results in
stride. 139  The no-exceptions approach purports to improve
administrative efficiency, remove discretion from judges, and closely
adhere to Supreme Court precedent. However, the approach fails to
recognize the other First Amendment principles valued by the Court
in Garcetti and its prior precedents. The benefits of the no-exceptions
approach are largely illusory, and the rule undermines individual
justice and the integrity of the judiciary.
The primary doctrinal advantage of the no-exceptions rule is its
purported fidelity to Garcetti. By focusing solely on the central holding
of the case-that free speech rights do not protect statements or acts
made pursuant to public duties-lower courts give effect to the Court's
emphasis on efficient governance. 140 However, this focus is misplaced
for two reasons. First, reading Garcetti in such a strict fashion ignores
the decision's final paragraphs, which discuss possible limitations to
the doctrine. 141 Second, the rule gives no credence to the Court's
emphasis on the other First Amendment values reflected in its prior
precedents; speaker-centered and public discussion values remain
integral to the proper resolution of public employment disputes. 142
Another purported advantage of the no-exceptions rule is its
ease of administration. Along the same lines, the approach may reduce
judicial discretion and thus avoid democratically unaccountable
policymaking. However, as some critics have noted, determining an
employee's scope of employment is no simple matter, as evinced by
circuit splits over which factors should predominate. 143 Moreover,
because judges define the scope of an employee's duties through the
ruling-offers-glimmer-of-hope-in-post-garcetti-world (celebrating Jackler's citizen analogue
analysis as a welcome retreat from the overbearing Garcetti doctrine).
139. See supra Section II.C (describing cases where courts did not find First Amendment
protection).
140. Bowie, 653 F.3d at 46 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006)); Huppert
v. Pittsburg, 574 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2009).
141. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424; see supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
142. 547 U.S. at 419.
143. Keenan, supra note 17, at 847-60, 870-76.
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application of a standardless, totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry,
the no-exceptions bright-line rule is not a true check on judicial
discretion. Garcetti supplies creative jurists with the leeway to
obliquely emphasize certain factors here, and other factors there, to
produce the desired policy outcome.
In the end, though, the no-exceptions bright-line rule suffers
from the most basic of doctrinal flaws: its inability to cope with factual
scenarios that invoke strong feelings of injustice, like the police
brutality in Jackler144 or the allegations of police corruption in
Huppert.145 Injustice has harmful consequences, not only for fired
employees, but also for the public's faith in good government.
IV. A CRIMINAL LIABILITY SAFE HARBOR: ENFORCING THE
DEMOCRATICALLY ENACTED DEFINITION OF GOOD GOVERNMENT
Because neither of the dominant approaches applied by lower
courts effectively resolves the post-Garcetti circuit splits, an
alternative solution is required. For the sake of stare decisis,
government efficiency, and separation of powers, the solution should
consist of more than wishing away Garcetti and returning to the
Pickering-Connick balancing test. Courts should create a criminal
liability safe harbor for public employees under the First Amendment.
Under this safe harbor, if an employer directs an employee to speak in
a manner that would subject the employee to criminal liability, the
speech would not fall within the scope of employment. The issue in
each case, then, is whether the employee can prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that compliance with the employer's
directive would make the employee criminally liable. This Part
delineates the parameters of this proposed solution and outlines its
theoretical and practical merits.
A. Mechanics of the Criminal Liability Safe Harbor
The mechanics of the proposed solution are relatively
straightforward. The first major issue concerns when the criminal
liability rule is triggered. Must the employee actually violate a
criminal statute in order to invoke his First Amendment rights? If not,
at what point can the employee legitimately claim that his
recalcitrance was motivated by potential criminal liability? Requiring
the employee to actually violate a criminal statute would be
144. Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 231-32 (2d Cir. 2011).
145. 574 F.3d at 699.
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anomalous, given that the nature of a right to free speech implies the
ability to object to unseemly conduct without suffering adverse
consequences. Risking criminal liability is not a superior alternative to
being fired. Therefore, the inquiry should focus on whether the
employer actually requested that the employee commit a crime and
whether the employee's failure to comply with that request caused
retaliatory action. These two elements-the criminal request and
causation-do not depend on the employee's subsequent conduct.
The second major issue concerns how the plaintiff meets the
evidentiary burden to trigger the criminal liability safe harbor.
Because public employees typically challenge speech restrictions
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and because the solution proposed in this
Note is merely a slight modification of current First Amendment
doctrine, courts should apply the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard. 146 Unanimous and longstanding judicial interpretations of §
1983 make this clear:
[A] plaintiff making a First Amendment retaliation claim . . . must initially demonstrate
by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) his speech was constitutionally protected,
(2) he suffered an adverse employment decision, and (3) a causal connection exists
between his speech and the adverse employment determination against him, so that it
can be said that his speech was a motivating factor in the determination. 14 7
To establish the first element of this test-that the speech is
constitutionally protected-the proposed solution would place the
burden on the employee (the plaintiff) to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that fulfilling the employer's directive would require the
violation of a criminal statute. Importantly, the inquiry would be
totally objective, without regard to whether the plaintiff mistakenly
believed that the employer demanded a criminal violation. This
objective approach is consistent with traditional § 1983 jurisprudence,
which requires proof of an actual, not merely believed, constitutional
violation. To hold otherwise would expand or contract constitutional
protections based on each plaintiffs ignorance of the law. For example,
under this proposed evidentiary framework, the plaintiff in Jackler
could have introduced evidence proving, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that (1) his observations about excessive force were true and
(2) filing a false report with the department would have violated a
146. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) ("Every person who ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured. . . .").
147. See Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension of Schenectady Cnty., 252 F.3d 545, 553
(2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 1999)).
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criminal statute. 148 Indeed, New York state law provided that a
"person is guilty of offering a false instrument for filing in the second
degree when, knowing that a written instrument contains a false
statement or false information, he offers or presents it to a public
office or public servant."149 Then, Jackler would have needed to prove
retaliatory action and causation. Under the test proposed here,
Jackler would have prevailed on his § 1983 claim if discovery
confirmed the facts alleged within his complaint.
The third issue concerns federalism and the relationship
between federal and state statutes. To maintain fidelity to the
constitutional doctrines of anti-commandeering and preemption, the
safe harbor would, in some cases, treat employee speech differently
depending on whether the employee is a state or federal official.
Federal employees could claim the exception on the basis that their
employer asked them to violate federal law, but not state law.150 This
requirement comes from the Supremacy Clause. 15 1 The Court has held
that a federal official is immune from state law if his acts were
"authorized by controlling federal law."152 Thus, if a federal official
acts pursuant to federal law, but in contravention of state law, then
that act would not constitute a criminal violation. As such, the
criminal liability safe harbor proposed here would not apply. However,
the typical case, involving an employee retaliated against for giving
subpoenaed testimony or refusing to falsify information, would trigger
the safe harbor irrespective of state law. For instance, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1621 criminalizes giving false testimony before a competent tribunal
or in any official "declaration, certificate, verification, or statement."153
148. See 658 F.3d at 230-31 (discussing the request of the employer to falsify the affidavit).
149. N.Y PENAL LAW § 175.30 (McKinney 2010).
150. The Supreme Court has held that federal officials acting pursuant to their official duties
are immune from state prosecution:
[I]f the prisoner is held in the state court to answer for an act which he was
authorized to do by the law of the United States, which it was his duty to do as
marshal of the United States, and if in doing that act, he did no more than what was
necessary and proper for him to do, he cannot be guilty of a crime under the law of the
State of California. This is the font of Supremacy Clause immunity.
Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 75 (1890). However, federal employees could claim a safe
harbor under state law if Congress explicitly chose to allow the prosecution of federal officials
pursuant to state criminal law. In that scenario, Congress would effectively affirm the state
prosecution, which would avoid preemption under the Supremacy Clause. See Seth P. Waxman &
Trevor W. Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers, State Criminal Law, and the
Supremacy Clause, 112 YALE L.J. 2195, 2243 (2003) (noting that under the Federal Tort Claims
Act the federal government has consented to the prosecution of state law claims against federal
officials acting within the scope of their duties).
151. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
152. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 490 (1978).
153. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2012).
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Likewise, 18 U.S.C. § 401 criminalizes "disobedience or resistance
to . . . [a federal court's] lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or
command." 154 Therefore, an employee who suffered retaliation because
he or she resisted an order not to testify before a court or
administrative agency would qualify under the criminal liability safe
harbor.
As for state public employees, they could prevail under the safe
harbor for requested violations of state law and most federal laws.
Under the preemption doctrine, the federal government can prohibit
conduct that is authorized under state law and prosecute state
officials for violations of federal law. 155 However, under the anti-
commandeering doctrine enunciated in Printz v. United States and
New York v. United States, the federal government may not enact laws
forcing state executive officials to take affirmative actions. 15 6 A federal
criminal provision imposing an affirmative duty requiring state
officials to testify in court in their official capacity would therefore
likely violate the anti-commandeering doctrine. These federalism
concerns undoubtedly add an extra level of complexity to the solution
proposed in this Note. Such concerns, though, already affect virtually
every area of constitutional law, and federal and state courts already
understand how to apply these doctrines. Thus, the federalism hurdle
presented by the Supremacy Clause does not undercut the
administrative efficiency or predictability of a criminal liability safe
harbor.
B. Justifications for the Criminal Liability Safe Harbor
Adoption of the criminal liability safe harbor, as described
above, offers several theoretical and practical advantages to the
prevailing citizen analogue and no-exceptions bright-line approaches;
at the same time, the proposal maintains fidelity to the language and
spirit of Garcetti. The goal, as the Court's jurisprudence suggests, is to
find an appropriate balance between competing values. The
government's interest in the efficient administration of the law must
154. Id. § 401; see also id. § 6004 (authorizing administrative agencies to seek orders
requiring individuals to testify).
155. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 37 (1824) (holding state laws that directly
conflict with federal laws are preempted); McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 436
(1819) (holding that state law may not invalidate constitutional exercises of power by the federal
government).
156. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932 (1997) (holding that federal laws may not
commandeer state executive officials to take affirmative actions); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (holding that federal laws may not commandeer state legislative officials to
take affirmative actions).
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be weighed against both the employee's interest in speaker-centered
autonomy and society's interest in the free dissemination of
information regarding government misconduct.157
A criminal liability safe harbor is desirable because it creates
automatic symmetry between governmental and individual interests.
A public employer is obligated to fulfill its statutorily defined mission,
but that mission, by virtue of the limits imposed by criminal law, may
only be achieved through legal means. This is what it means to be a
democratic government under the rule of law. Simply put, achieving a
government objective via means that violate criminal law is not a
proper function of an agency; therefore, the safe harbor cannot, by
definition, impede the efficient administration of executive officials. In
fact, affording constitutional protection to public employees in this
context will improve the administration of law. Should a government
employer seek to violate criminal law, its public employees may
internally resist such an infraction. As Professor Paul H. Robinson has
argued, a criminal code is a normative expression of the conduct that
society deems to be just and draws its ability to influence behavior
from this moral authority.15 8 The criminal liability safe harbor would
create a constitutionally enforceable rule of good governance.
The safe harbor proposed here, however, would only provide
protection from criminal liability, not civil liability. The rationale for
this distinction is rooted in the differing purposes of civil and criminal
sanctions. The civil-criminal distinction separates conduct that society
seeks to price from conduct that society seeks to prohibit.159 Civil fines
are levied to force actors to internalize the costs of behavior (e.g.,
polluting) that cause externalities. 6 0 Such activity is not so morally
blameworthy as to warrant a complete prohibition. Under the right
conditions, it may be wise for an actor to engage in the activity so long
as the external costs do not exceed the internal benefits.161 Applying
this rationale to the free speech rights of public employees, the
employer may ask the employee to subject himself to civil liability, but
157. See supra Part II.A (discussing the Court's treatment of traditional First Amendment
principles in pre-Garcetti jurisprudence).
158. See Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks Is
Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1839, 1840 (2000) ("[Tlhe
perception of a criminal code as doing justice is necessary for the code's moral credibility, which
in turn is necessary for the effective crime control that the drafters seek.").
159. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law
Models-and What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1876-77 (2002) (noting the
distinction between pricing civil offenses and prohibiting criminal offenses); Paul H. Robinson,
The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L. REV. 201, 204 (1996) (same).
160. Coffee, supra note 159, at 1882.
161. Id. at 1883,
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the act's benefits to the government may exceed the costs to the
public. Therefore, the employee may not be acting in opposition to the
agency's statutorily defined mission. By contrast, criminal penalties
are imposed to totally prohibit an activity and to deny any benefit
from it.162 Criminal acts are considered so blameworthy that such
behavior is never accepted, and every individual has a moral right to
be free of the conduct. 163 Criminal acts committed by government
agents cannot, by definition, produce benefits for the public that
exceed the costs. Thus, a public employee who violates a criminal law
is always acting in opposition to the agency's statutorily defined
mission. Therefore, retaining the civil-criminal distinction in the safe
harbor proposed here is crucial to maintaining the symmetry between
the government's and public employee's interests.
A second theoretical advantage of the criminal liability safe
harbor is the provision of a single, easily applied solution to the three
separate circuit splits regarding the scope of employment and the
refusal of employees to cover up government abuse. 6 4 Rather than
protecting discrete categories of speech (e.g., giving truthful
testimony) on an ad hoc basis, the criminal liability safe harbor
creates a high degree of certainty. Applying this rule is
straightforward and not, as Chief Justice Roberts famously put it, like
"looking out over a crowd and picking out your friends." 165
Relatedly, the criminal liability safe harbor also preserves
separation of powers by limiting judicial discretion. Criminal law is
defined and enforced by the legislative and executive branches, which
are responsive to the will of the people. This reality puts a natural,
democratic constraint on the lengths to which courts may expand the
safe harbor.166 Similarly, if the polity disfavored the safe harbor-
perhaps based on a desire for efficient government administration at
almost any cost-criminal statutes could be rewritten to exempt their
application to public employees fulfilling public duties. In essence, the
rule proposed in this Note places the choice in the hands of the voters,
asking them to think critically about whether they want public
162. Id. at 1884.
163. Id.
164. See supra Part II.C (describing how these disagreements among lower courts amount to
a single concern regarding objections to unethical demands).
165. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Adam Liptak, Roberts Fields Questions on Privacy and
Precedents, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at Al (quoting confirmation hearing testimony from
Chief Justice Roberts concerning the undesirability of unlimited judicial discretion, particularly
when citing international precedent).
166. Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 87
(1980) (arguing that judicial review should be applied to reinforce participation and
representation in the democratic process).
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employees to disobey the law. Therefore, the criminal liability safe
harbor fulfills the Court's goal of limiting the "intrusive role" of
mandated "judicial oversight of communications between and among
government employees and their superiors in the course of official
business."167
Admittedly, the choice to protect public employees with a
criminal liability safe harbor already rests in the hands of the voters;
they could demand that their legislators pass various whistleblower
statutes. However, the current default rule, which imposes
punishment on employees in the absence of statutory protection,
burdens individual employees rather than society writ large.
Therefore, the public currently has little incentive to advocate for
adequate whistleblower protections. By contrast, the proposed
criminal liability default rule is superior because the burden of
protecting employees falls on the government, which can broadly
diffuse any negative effects across the electorate. This change would
force the public to closely consider the costs and benefits of failing to
protect public employee speech. 168
From a practical standpoint, the criminal liability safe harbor
is useful for several reasons. First, administration of the proposal will
be straightforward because the safe harbor is, by its very nature, a
categorical bright-line rule. Courts would only need to evaluate
whether the directive from the public employer would force the
employee to violate criminal law. Thus, in contrast to the citizen
analogue test,169 which requires an examination of public policy
regarding the history and importance of particular conduct, or the
Pickering-Connick balancing test, which requires an unguided
weighing of nebulous factors, 170 the criminal liability safe harbor is
relatively straightforward. The clarity of this safe harbor also provides
clear notice to public employees. Under traditional principles of
statutory construction, criminal statutes are interpreted in light of
contemporary, ordinary public understanding in order to enhance the
ability of the average citizen to understand them.171 Therefore, the
167. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 (2006).
168. Cf. Tara Mikkilineni, Note, Constitutional Default Rules and Interbranch Cooperation,
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1403, 1411 (2007) (asserting that the Court "may spur a legislative response by
announcing a rule that disfavors political majorities, prompting these majorities to take action to
replace the default rule").
169. See supra Part III.A (describing the citizen analogue test).
170. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text (analyzing the Court's application of the
balancing test).
171. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998) (attempting to discern the




safe harbor would provide public employees with enough information
ex ante to understand the scope of their First Amendment right to
willfully disobey the orders of their superiors.
Moreover, the clarity of the criminal liability safe harbor may
limit courts' tendency to surreptitiously massage the scope-of-
employment inquiry.172 Due to the highly flexible and undefined
nature of the current scope-of-employment test, courts may be
tempted to withdraw or expand this boundary in order to promote an
equitable outcome. The criminal liability safe harbor provides a basis
for protecting the free speech rights of employees that is rooted in
criminal codes that have been refined through years of judicial
interpretation. As such, courts would be less tempted to manipulate
the scope-of-employment factors to reach a just result.
Finally, litigators should consider asking courts to recognize
the criminal liability safe harbor proposed in this Note because lower
court judges could be persuaded to adopt the safe harbor as a
reasonable interpretation of Garcetti. This proposed rule is consistent
with the language enunciated in Garcetti that suggests exceptions
may be made pursuant to criminal law. As the Court stated,
"[O]bligations arising from any other applicable constitutional
provisions and mandates of the criminal and civil laws, protect
employees and provide checks on supervisors who would order
unlawful or otherwise inappropriate actions."173 This language, at first
glance, only appears to mean that governments may place criminal
restrictions on employers themselves, but it also supports recognizing
a criminal-liability exception for employees. Lower court judges and
lawyers could cite this linguistic hook to justify mitigating the
harshness of Garcetti.
Despite its advantages, the criminal liability safe harbor
arguably possesses some flaws. One could contend, for instance, that
one's constitutional rights should not fluctuate according to the
dictates of various criminal laws. Constitutional limitations may be
seen as legal rules that are separate from and superior to ordinary
legislative enactments.174 However, this criticism fails to recognize
that there are other areas of constitutional law in which one's rights
do, in fact, depend on legislative definitions. For instance, one's right
to procedural due process for the deprivation of property fluctuates
172. See supra Part II C. 1 (describing the scope-of-employment test circuit split).
173. 547 U.S. 410, 425-26 (2006); see supra notes 71-73.
174. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 401-08 (1819) (providing the classic
justification of constitutional law as a permanent limitation on ordinary statutory authority).
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according to the common law and legislative enactments that
establish property entitlements.175
Additionally, the criminal liability safe harbor could be
criticized for granting more rights to public employees than employees
in the private sector. As Professor Kermit Roosevelt III has noted, an
at-will private employee is not afforded constitutional protection
against termination for speech an employer dislikes. 76 Due to the
state action doctrine, an accountant who fails to fulfill his boss's order
to cover up tax evasion (a clearly criminal act) has no constitutional
defense against being fired.'77 A private employee's only choice in such
a situation is to resign, an option that is also available to public
employees.178 However, this objection fails to note the additional First
Amendment value-beyond speaker-centered autonomy-that is
implicated in the public employment context: the public's interest in
learning about government misconduct. 79 Public employees deserve
extra protection precisely because they occupy a special place in
society as the guarantors of good government. Therefore, the benefits
of a criminal liability safe harbor outweigh any perceived
disadvantages.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Garcetti has been subject to
consistent and withering scrutiny. 80 By purporting to eliminate First
Amendment protection for all speech made pursuant to an employee's
official conduct, the Court sharply limited the ability of public
employees to refuse criminal demands made by their employers. As a
consequence, employees continue to be subjected to retaliatory action
that is unjustified and even works against the public interest.
Something is amiss when the Constitution no longer protects an
175. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570, 576 (1972) (holding that due process rights
derive not from "assessing and balancing the weights of the particular interests involved," but
rather from individual claims of "entitlement" granted by state and federal law); see also
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-63 (1970) (noting that exact contours of one's due process
rights vary with the type of entitlement at issue).
176. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Not as Bad as You Think- Why Garcetti v. Ceballos Makes
Sense, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 631, 637 (2012) (noting the symmetry that Garcetti creates between
the constitutional rights of private and public employees).
177. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883) (holding that constitutional rights are
infringed only through state action, not private conduct).
178. See Roosevelt, supra note 176, at 637.
179. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006).
180. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (highlighting the negative reaction to Garcetti).
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employee who refuses to conceal police brutality.'8' For this reason, an
absolutist reading of Garcetti that leaves no room for protected speech
within the scope of public employment is fundamentally unfair,
especially as the number of public employees in the United States
continues to increase.182 At the same time, the citizen analogue test
utilized by some lower courts finds no support in the text of Garcetti,
and it appears to be limited by nothing more than the policy
preferences of judges. 83 However, the lower courts' inability to
propose workable alternatives does not counsel in favor of rejecting
Garcetti and its concern with government efficiency. The Court
correctly noted that unaccountable judges applying First Amendment
doctrine are not suited to making sensitive judgments about job
performance.184 Therefore, Garcetti should be retained and lower
courts should recognize a criminal liability safe harbor for public
employees. By doing so, courts can promote government efficiency and
give effect to society's democratically enacted understanding of
legitimate conduct. A criminal liability safe harbor is grounded in the
logic and text of Garcetti and blunts the rough edges of its impact.
This solution would optimally balance managerial efficiency with
respect for freedom of expression. In a democracy, the First
Amendment should protect an employee whose speech promotes the
public interest.
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